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The police have started to use malware—and other forms of government hacking—
to solve crimes. Some fear coming abuses—the widespread use of malware when
traditional investigative techniques would work just as well or to investigate politi-
cal opponents or dissident speakers. This Article argues that these abuses will be
checked, at least in part, by the very nature of malware and the way it must be
controlled. This analysis utilizes a previously unformalized research methodology
called “investigative dynamics” to come to these conclusions. Because every use of
malware risks spoiling the tool—by revealing a software vulnerability that can be
patched—the police will always encounter constraints and disincentives to wide-
spread and unchecked use. These constraints will operate much like so-called leg-
islative “superwarrant” requirements, which some have urged Congress to enact for
malware. The investigative dynamics of malware suggest that Congress could fol-
low this advice without disrupting police conduct in any significant measure.
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INTRODUCTION
From February 20 to March 4, 2015, the FBI infected hundreds and maybe
thousands of computers with malware, a computer virus designed to help uncover
the identity of people who had configured their computers precisely to avoid being
identified.1 The FBI suspected all of the targets of the malware of accessing a
website called PlayPen, purportedly the single largest repository of child pornogra-
phy online at the time.2 The malware fulfilled the FBI’s intended purpose, leading
to hundreds of arrests in the United States and hundreds of referrals to foreign law
enforcement partners.3
The PlayPen case illuminates more than any before it the increasing use by law
enforcement of malware—and other forms of government hacking—as an investiga-
tive tool.4 The use of malware is sometimes necessary, the FBI contends, to bring
to justice people who use encrypted services such as Tor and Tor-hidden services—
the heart of what is colloquially called the darknet or dark web—who cannot other-
wise be identified, arrested, or deterred.5
1 See United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351-RJB, 2016 WL 337263, at *1–3
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016) (describing the FBI’s use of a network investigative technology
(NIT) to access computers users had configured to mask identifying information); see also
Joseph Cox, Lawyers: FBI Must Reveal Malware for Hacking Child Porn Users or Drop Its
Case, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 25, 2016, 7:35 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en
_us/article/ezpvp4/fbi-playpen-malware-NIT-Jay-michaud [https://perma.cc/FW7V-Y4QQ]
(describing NIT as malware).
2 Michaud, 2016 WL 337263, at *1.
3 Joseph Cox, Child Porn Sting Goes Global: FBI Hacked Computers in Denmark,
Greece, Chile, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 22, 2016, 2:01 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com
/en_us/article/qkj8q3/child-porn-sting-goes-global-fbi-hacked-computers-in-denmark-greece
-chile [https://perma.cc/WG6R-TEGU].
4 See generally Jonathan Mayer, Government Hacking, 127 YALE L.J. (forthcoming Jan.
2018) (manuscript at 1–7) (on file with author) (discussing examples and the rise of gov-
ernment hacking); Cox, supra note 1 (describing the government’s PlayPen hacking cam-
paign as unprecedented in scope).
5 See Ellen Nakashima, FBI Use of Hacking Tool to Find Child-Porn Users Affirmed,
WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2016, at A2 (discussing the FBI’s obtaining of search warrants to use
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Many law and policy questions arise from the use of malware in criminal inves-
tigations.6 Is the use of malware to obtain a hidden IP address a search under the
Fourth Amendment? Will officials abuse malware to spy on political opponents and
dissidents? Should the police be allowed to use malware to investigate minor crimes?
Should Congress require additional procedures for law enforcement’s use of malware?
All three branches of government will be debating questions like these for some
time. These tools are too powerful and the application of prior legal rules to them
too uncertain to have ready answers to questions like these. This Article hopes to
contribute to the coming debates by clarifying what is possible, likely, unlikely, and
impossible to occur as the government expands its development, acquisition, and use
of these tools.
To do this, the Article also proposes a distinctive research methodology for
assessing the impact of technology on policing, criminal procedure, and criminal
justice, one that can be extended far beyond malware. This methodology builds on
much of my prior work, but particularly on an article entitled Probably Probable
Cause: The Diminishing Importance of Justification Standards, which looked at how
online investigative techniques had diminished the importance of the venerable prob-
able cause standard.7 I argued that, at least in police investigations of crimes occur-
ring online, almost every new investigative lead comes bundled with probable cause.8
Unlike the physical world, the online world tends not to produce evidence that seems
somewhat suspicious but not enough to establish probable cause, which means that
we should no longer think of probable cause as the only tool with which we pro-
tected ourselves from unfettered police investigations.9
I am formalizing this methodological approach, which I am calling an “investi-
gative dynamics” approach, and applying it to the use of malware by the police. This
methodology focuses in particular on how emerging technologies impact policing.
It begins with an accurate description of the technology, considered on its own but
also in the context of broader societal considerations. It marshals this technological
description to try to narrow the scope of what we debate: sometimes fears about what
the police or criminals might do with a given technology are unfounded because
something—the technology, regulation, institutions, incentives, etc.—render that
hacking tools to hack users of child porn); Cox, supra note 3 (describing the PlayPen site as
being on the “dark web”). See generally Tor: Hidden Service Protocol, TOR, https://www
.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en [https://perma.cc/74X4-6B8N] (last visited
Dec. 4, 2017); Tor: Overview, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en [https://
perma.cc/SYW9-6KUH] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
6 See, e.g., Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Sandy Clark & Susan Landau, Lawful
Hacking: Using Existing Vulnerabilities for Wiretapping on the Internet, 12 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 1, 26–27, 44–47 (2014) [hereinafter Bellovin et al.].
7 Paul Ohm, Probably Probable Cause: The Diminishing Importance of Justification
Standards, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1514 (2010).
8 Id.
9 See id. at 1515, 1555–59.
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conduct implausible or impossible. The investigative dynamics approach reveals
these implausibilities or impossibilities and provides an argument for giving them
less attention.
Applied to the emerging government use of malware, investigative dynamics
suggests all of the following, none of which I argue has been highlighted promi-
nently in the debate so far. First, the government is extremely reluctant to allow law
enforcement to use malware expansively.10 Malware operates by exploiting vulnera-
ble software, and every use of malware increases the likelihood that a previously
unknown vulnerability will be detected and patched.11 Second, malware is a direct
response to the rise of easy-to-use robust encryption, particularly hidden services on
Tor.12 The police will find malware most useful and necessary when surveillance
targets are obscuring their identities using technologies like these. Finally, malware
must be deployed, monitored, and disarmed to be used.13 This requires a large tech-
nical support team and involves more uncertainty than traditional search approaches.14
All of these observations suggest that even absent outside pressure or a new law
or regulation, the government is likely to deploy malware primarily in cases involving
serious crimes, thorough bureaucratic review, probable cause, judicial review, and
when less-invasive surveillance techniques will not work. PlayPen involved every one
of these salutary protective steps, and the investigative dynamics suggest that this
was not a coincidence. The nature of malware helped bring about these results. We
should not preoccupy ourselves too much worrying about hypothetical but im-
plausible uses of malware in the absence of probable cause or judicial review, by
uncounseled agents in remote field offices, or to investigate minor crime.
None of this is to say, however, that governments cannot abuse malware.15 We
need some baseline of protection—ideally legislation—to prevent the use of malware
for fishing expeditions or to spy on people who are not suspected of committing
serious crimes.
The most important implication of this analysis is thus to support new legisla-
tion to require more than merely probable cause and judicial review for the use of
10 See, e.g., Ahmed Ghappour, Searching Places Unknown: Law Enforcement Jurisdiction
on the Dark Web, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1121 (2017).
11 See id. at 1079–80, 1095–97, 1110–11; Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: What Is a Zero
Day?, WIRED (Nov. 11, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/11/what-is-a-zero
-day/ [https://perma.cc/ENX4-68TK].
12 See, e.g., Nakashima, supra note 5, at A2.
13 See Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 13–18).
14 See id.; see also, e.g., Bellovin et al., supra note 6, at 40–41 (describing the govern-
ment’s need for “supporting infrastructure” for operations involving malware).
15 See Azam Ahmed & Nicole Perlroth, Using Texts as Lures, Government Spyware
Targets Mexican Journalists and Their Families, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2017), https://www
.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/world/americas/mexico-spyware-anticrime.html (describing uses
by Mexican authorities of spyware to spy on political dissidents and journalists).
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malware—what some refer to as a “superwarrant for malware” requirement.16 The
imposition of new superwarrant requirements—such as necessity, intra-agency review,
and strict time limits17—are necessary to prevent predictable abuses yet will not pose
significant barriers to law enforcement operations.18 They will merely require a judge
to require proof of what already seems to be happening—a strictly limited and mea-
sured use of malware restricted to important and urgent cases.
Finally, a better understanding of the investigative dynamics will contribute to the
“going dark” debate, the roiling public debate about what encryption is doing to law
enforcement and what, if anything, can be done about it.19 The need to use malware
will increase with the spread of easy-to-use, strong encryption. But the investigative
dynamics suggest that malware will never and can never replace the straightforward
investigative tools the police have lost.
This Article proceeds in three additional parts. Part I introduces the investigative
dynamics approach to reasoning about the impact of technology on criminal proce-
dure. Part II applies this technique to the use by law enforcement of malware, con-
cluding that structural controls already limit the worst abuses of malware. Part III
uses these observations to support legislation imposing superwarrant requirements on
the use by law enforcement of malware and to contribute to the going dark debate.
I. METHODOLOGY: STUDYING THE DYNAMICS OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT INVESTIGATION
In cases involving the use by law enforcement of powerful new technological
tools, we should study how, in the absence of laws regulating their use, the tools are
created, disseminated, controlled, and reigned in.20 Such study will often reveal the
investigative dynamics of the tools, which will help us predict how a tool is likely
or unlikely to be used. This might give us reason to fear that a tool is susceptible to
undetected abuse, which would support calls for external constraints. Or it might
16 See Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 10, 24–26, 73–78); see also Kevin Bankston,
Ending the Endless Crypto Debate: Three Things We Should Be Arguing About Instead of
Encryption Backdoors, LAWFARE (June 14, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/ending
-endless-crypto-debate-three-things-we-should-be-arguing-about-instead-encryption-back
doors [https://perma.cc/CM4Z-YN9S]; Andrew Crocker, What to Do About Lawless Govern-
ment Hacking and the Weakening of Digital Security, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.
(Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/08/what-do-about-lawless-government
-hacking-and-weakening-digital-security [https://perma.cc/8SHY-JJ6D].
17 See Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 73).
18 See Bankston, supra note 16.
19 See BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y AT HARVARD UNIV., DON’T PANIC:
MAKING PROGRESS ON THE “GOING DARK” DEBATE 1 (2016), https://cyber.harvard.edu
/pubrelease/dont-panic/Dont_Panic_Making_Progress_on_Going_Dark_Debate.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9UDK-PH3H] [hereinafter DON’T PANIC].
20 I focus on the use by law enforcement of new technology, but this analysis might also
apply to the use of new technology by criminals.
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lead us to believe that a tool is not so likely to be abused, which would support a
wait-and-see approach to regulation and oversight.
A. Probably Probable Cause
In Probably Probable Cause: The Diminishing Importance of Justification Stan-
dards, I argued that the police tend to build up suspicion in real-world investigations
very differently than how they do so in online investigations.21 In the real world, the
police will often gather evidence that is somewhat suspicious but not nearly enough
to establish probable cause.22 Cases like Terry v. Ohio build on this observation, cre-
ating a sliding scale of search and seizure permitting the police to conduct less than a
full-blown search—namely a stop and frisk—with less than probable cause suspicion.23
In contrast, I argued that “the Internet is a hunch-free zone,” meaning that the
evidence gathered in investigations into online crime tend to provide either probable
cause or no suspicion at all.24 I came to this conclusion by focusing on the intrinsic
characteristics of the technology, namely “the design of modern communications
networks” and “the crucial role played by online intermediaries like telephone and
Internet service providers.”25
The heart of the proof of this claim was a “structural” examination of five
features of online spaces and investigations:
Suspicion builds incrementally in the real world and oscillates
between probable cause and nothing online for at least five rea-
sons. First, evidence online almost always comes surrounded by
a rich context, providing a high level of built-in suspicion to a sus-
picious e-mail or IP address. Second, the path from victim back
to suspect is fixed and often traceable. Third, the “eye witnesses”
online tend to be sophisticated corporate intermediaries without
relevant biases or agendas. Fourth, these intermediaries and the vic-
tims themselves deploy pervasive systems of surveillance. Fifth,
these surveillance systems record precise, unambiguous evidence.26
I used these observations to feed back into debates over the proper statutory and
constitutional privacy protections to apply in online investigations.27 Most impor-
tantly, the underappreciated irrelevance of justification standards online suggested
21 Ohm, supra note 7, at 1515, 1527–28, 1555–59.
22 Id. at 1525–28.
23 See 392 U.S. 1, 10, 20 (1968).
24 Ohm, supra note 7, at 1515, 1529.
25 Id. at 1515.
26 Id. at 1529.
27 See generally id.
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the surprising irrelevance of the frequent and roiling debates in Congress over
whether to raise the standards for access to stored email in the Stored Communica-
tions Act from reasonable suspicion to probable cause.28 “Because the police almost
always have probable cause at every stage of every online investigation, whether we
set a requirement at relevance, reasonable suspicion, or probable cause, the police
will take every action at exactly the same time.”29
B. The Investigative Dynamics Approach
Latent within Probably Probable Cause was what I recognize now as a distinc-
tive methodology, one worth spelling out more explicitly. The study of the dynamics
of law enforcement investigation—investigative dynamics for short—focuses not only
on what law enforcement officers theoretically could do, if so inclined, but instead
it surfaces what officers will most likely feel compelled to do or not do, given the
constraints of incentives, oversight, and—perhaps most distinctively and impor-
tantly—technology. This methodology focuses intently on police tradecraft, on an
accurate, empirically obtained description of what law enforcement tends to do rather
than paying sole attention to what it possibly could do.
The methodology can be used to scrutinize the impact of any technology relevant
to police investigations. These might include surveillance technology (like malware),
tools operated directly by the police to gather information about targets, whether
directly from those targets or from the surrounding environment. Other surveillance
technologies susceptible to this analysis would include wiretapping devices, facial
recognition systems, and cell-site simulators. The methodology also applies, as in
Probably Probable Cause, to technologies owned or operated by people other than
the police that tend to produce evidence of crime that might be of interest to the po-
lice.30 In that article, I focused in particular on private-operated Internet systems that
logged evidence of online behavior, such as web server log files and email headers.31
The methodology comprises three steps. First, describe the technology accu-
rately and in as much detail as is necessary to illuminate the next two steps. Second,
assess whether features of the technology place or remove direct or indirect con-
straints or incentives on police behavior. Third, elaborate how these newly surfaced
constraints or incentives inform debates about the likely impact or need to regulate
the use of technology by police. The three steps focus on the technology, police
behavior, and law (and policy), respectively. Consider each step in greater detail.
The first step focuses not on the characteristics of the technology in a vacuum,
isolated from broader contexts. Instead, it looks at what many call the socio-technical
28 Id. at 1520, 1549.
29 Id. at 1549.
30 See, e.g., id. at 1533–34.
31 Id.
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context, although I think that is a bit too grandiose a term for a simple idea: what
matters is how the technology fits into pre-existing patterns of human behavior and
institutions.32 In fact, the essential point of the investigative dynamics methodology
is to get beyond thinking about what the technology might possibly, conceivably do,
irrespective of other constraints, in favor of thinking about what is likely to happen.
Some uses are possible but so unlikely to occur as not to merit serious consideration.
Returning to Probably Probable Cause, a police officer might conceivably find
an email address in the “little black book” of a drug dealer, a scrap of online evidence
that might be suspicious but not quite enough to support probable cause.33 The inves-
tigative dynamics approach acknowledges this possibility but argues that this kind
of evidence does not turn up frequently enough to displace the general conclusion that
email addresses tend to be packaged with enough context to support probable cause.34
The second step connects these contextualized characteristics of technology to
constraints or incentives on the police. In this step, attention is paid to aspects of
technology that make given activities impossible or possible, unlikely or likely. This
is perhaps the distinctive move of the methodology, one that borrows from the way
technologists and scientists talk about new technology, often analyzing it to con-
clude how the technology is likely to be used. This kind of thinking does not come
easily to non-technologists generally, and legal scholars in particular, who worry about
making predictions about technology.35
Encryption will often play a key role in this step, as it does in this Article’s
analysis of malware, even though it did not factor prominently in Probably Probable
Cause. Encryption, when applied properly, can render the possible impossible and
vice versa. For the prognosticator of technology, encryption prunes certain branch-
ing possibilities off of the tree of the future.
Finally, step three applies the newly surfaced constraints or incentives to debates
about how best to police the police. This step is the practical payoff that connects
the assessment of the technology to policy and scholarly conversations about criminal
procedure and criminal justice. In Probably Probable Cause, because the Internet
had reduced the number of incidents in which the police have some suspicion but
not quite probable cause, I argued that law enforcement had fewer grounds to object
to legislative proposals to amend the Stored Communications Act to require proba-
ble cause to read email, for example.36
Although this methodology is meant to be precise and rigorous, it is my hope
that it can avoid becoming bogged down in terminology or too much formality. I
32 See, e.g., HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 4–6 (2009).
33 Ohm, supra note 7, at 1545.
34 Id. at 1546–47.
35 See, e.g., Daniel Gervais, The Regulation of Inchoate Technologies, 47 HOUS. L. REV.
665, 669, 685 (2010).
36 See Ohm, supra note 7, at 1535–42.
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intend for this to be a practical methodology, one both scholars and practitioners can
utilize. The methodology is also not meant to be applied rigidly. For example, rather
than march through the three steps sequentially, we will often bounce back and forth
between them.
II. LAW ENFORCEMENT USE OF MALWARE
What are the investigative dynamics of malware? Part I detailed three steps used
to assess the investigative dynamics of a particular technology. In this part, I apply
the first two steps of the methodology—the characteristics of the technology and the
impact on law enforcement—focusing on three aspects of malware. First, malware
is a “wasting resource.” Second, the need for malware is most compelling in the face
of well-implemented encryption, especially on the darknet. And third, malware-aided
investigations are a tailored and concerted undertaking. Part III will undertake step
three, an analysis of what these newly revealed investigative dynamics of malware
mean for many of the law and policy questions that have been raised. Before we begin,
let us review what we know about the increasing use by law enforcement of malware.
A. Malware37
Until the rise of Tor and the dark web, the use of government malware appears
to have been sporadic. For a decade, the only widely acknowledged use surrounded
a bomb threat directed at Timberline High School in Washington State in 2007.38
Commenters have pointed to the use by the government of key logging software, for
example, in the investigation of Nicky Scarfo in 1999.39
PlayPen marks a significant advance in the use of malware by law enforcement,
but it is not a solitary example, as news reports and court dockets are rife with other
recent examples.40
37 A note on terminology. In the emerging literature on this topic, different authors refer
to these bits of code using different names. Jonathan Mayer speaks generically of “government
hacking.” See Mayer, supra note 4. Ahmed Ghappour embraces the Justice Department’s
innocuous-sounding “network investigative technique,” or NIT. See Ghappour, supra note
10, at 1079. Steve Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Sandy Clark, and Susan Landau speak generally of
“exploits” but also point to DOJ’s mouthful, “Computer and Internal Protocol Address
Verifier” or CIPAV. See Bellovin et al., supra note 6, at 31–32. I, preferring not to mince
words, will stick with “malware” or, occasionally, “virus.”
38 See Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 4–5).
39 See, e.g., id. (manuscript at 5 & n.16); see also United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp.
2d 572, 574 (D.N.J. 2001).
40 See Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 14) (discussing “Operation Torpedo” and an
investigation into the “Freedom Hosting platform” in addition to the PlayPen investigation,
also known as “Operation Pacifier”).
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Malware is software designed to conduct surreptitious surveillance on a target’s
computer or network.41 Jonathan Mayer helpfully identifies four “steps” in the gov-
ernment’s use of malware: “delivery, exploitation, execution, and reporting.”42 Rather
than reiterate his detailed discussion of all four, consider a few thoughts on each,
focusing in particular on aspects highlighted in the discussion below.
To install malware, the police need some method for delivering software to the
target’s computer.43 In PlayPen, the government used a so-called “watering hole”
technique, taking control of a notorious distribution point for child pornography, but
allowing the server to continue to operate, in order to send malware to its users.44
Some delivery mechanisms are less technical, embracing techniques used in phishing
scams or other forms of social engineering.45 In fact, malware has reportedly been
delivered through USB drives left on the ground of parking lots or sold in mall
kiosks near the workplaces housing target networks.46
The most important of the four steps for this Article’s analysis is the exploitation
step. Because modern operating systems recognize malware behavior as threatening,
malware cannot operate unless it can exploit a vulnerability in the target computer’s
security systems.47 Malware thus competes in a multi-party arms race, as operating
system vendors seek out the same vulnerabilities and try to eliminate them by
distributing patches—small modifications that fix known vulnerabilities.48 Because
there is no such thing, and can never be, as perfect, bug-free code, this arms race is
continuously and indefinitely “re-armed” with new, vulnerable code, waiting to be
detected and exploited or patched.49
Very old malware is therefore usually useless, because it is tailored for old vul-
nerabilities that no longer exist; patch distribution is difficult to achieve at scale, how-
ever, and many computers and networks remain riddled with known vulnerabilities
41 See id. (manuscript at 4–5); see also Ghappour, supra note 10, at 1079–80.
42 Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 13). Ahmed Ghappour divides the activity of
government malware into “two steps: access to data and extraction of data.” Ghappour, supra
note 10, at 1096. Mayer’s first two steps correspond to Ghappour’s first step, and Mayer’s
last two steps correspond to Ghappour’s second. I am using Mayer’s framework because it
surfaces nuances relevant to my approach.
43 See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 13–15).
44 Id. (manuscript at 13–14, 14 n.41); see United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351
-RJB, 2016 WL 337263, at *1–3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016).
45 Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 13).
46 See Bruce Sterling, The Dropped Drive Hack, WIRED (June 29, 2011, 12:35 PM),
https://www.wired.com/2011/06/the-dropped-drive-hack/ [https://perma.cc/8N6U-RE48].
47 Bellovin et al., supra note 6, at 23–24 (defining “vulnerability” and “exploit”); see also
Ghappour, supra note 10, at 1097.
48 See Ghappour, supra note 10, at 1110.
49 See Bellovin et al., supra note 6, at 27–28, 30 (“We conclude that for the foreseeable
future, computer systems will continue to have exploitable, useful holes.”); see also Ghappour,
supra note 10, at 1110–12; Zetter, supra note 11.
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long after they have been discovered and addressed by patches.50 A stockpile of old
malware might still be useful, if a target has not upgraded to the latest patches.51 Still,
the most valuable and useful malware can exploit a vulnerability unknown to and
unpatched by the vendor, sometimes referred to as a “zero-day” or “0-day” vulnera-
bility, referring to the number of days since public discovery.52
In the execution step, the malware performs some function on the computer or
network it has infiltrated.53 This often entails rooting around a computer’s storage
or RAM for incriminating or identifying information.54
Finally, malware needs to phone home to law enforcement, reporting what it has
learned.55 Typically, they do so by sending the information back to a police server on
the public Internet configured to receive the information.56
B. The Investigative Dynamics of Malware
An assessment of the investigative dynamics of the use by law enforcement of
malware supports three conclusions that have not before been highlighted promi-
nently. First, malware is treated by the government as a wasting resource, causing
it to be subjected to significant constraints and protections. Second, malware is most
useful—and most often deployed—to find and watch targets who have protected
their activities and communications with robust encryption. Third, the delivery and
reporting steps of malware require a sophisticated and complex technological infra-
structure operated by technical experts.
1. Malware as a Wasting Resource
What stops the police from using malware indiscriminately? We might feel
comforted if we had reason to believe that something constrained the police, making
it less likely they would deploy malware without seeking permission from headquar-
ters or to investigative relatively minor crimes.
There are intrinsic characteristics of malware that act like technological checks
on government misuse or abuse. To be clear, the government absolutely can abuse
50 See, e.g., Bellovin et al., supra note 6, at 50, 54.
51 See id. at 54.
52 Id. at 23; Ari Schwartz & Rob Knake, Government’s Role in Vulnerability Disclosure:
Creating a Permanent and Accountable Vulnerability Equities Process 1, 3 (Belfer Ctr. for
Sci. & Int’l Affairs, Discussion Paper No. 2016-04, 2016), https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/de
fault/files/legacy/files/vulnerability-disclosure-web-final3.pdf [https://perma.cc/9S27-SQQE];
Zetter, supra note 11.
53 See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 16–17).
54 See id.
55 See id. (manuscript at 17); Sam Zeitlin, Note, Botnet Takedowns and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 746, 751–52 (2015).
56 See Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 17); Zeitlin, supra note 55, at 751–52.
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malware by deploying it when it is neither justified nor procedurally vetted. Mexican
officials are reported to have sent smartphone spyware to political opponents and
civil rights activists, despite promising a vendor to use the spyware only to investi-
gate terrorists and drug traffickers.57 But the intrinsic characteristics make such abuses
less likely and thus should give us some comfort against the untrammeled use.
a. Step One
Most importantly, every piece of government malware should be viewed as a
wasting resource.58 To infect a target computer, government malware must exploit
an existing software vulnerability.59 But vulnerabilities tend to disappear as soon as
they are discovered and patched.60 This is why there is a premium on so-called 0-day
or zero-day vulnerabilities, the name given to software flaws that are unknown to
the developer of the software and general public.61 The government (and others)
covet zero-days and guard the ones they know about jealously.62
Every exploit of a vulnerability hastens the public’s discovery and patching of
that vulnerability.63 If the affected target discovers the access to the system that the
exploit allowed, he or she is likelier to report or investigate what happened, and thus
likelier to bring about the discovery and patch of the vulnerability.64 In some cases,
a copy of the exploit itself can be obtained from an infected machine, giving the mal-
ware research community—made up of academic researchers and for-profit antivirus
firms—an opportunity to reverse-engineer the code, shedding a light on the vulnera-
bility and possibly even implicating the government in the conduct.65
If zero-day vulnerabilities were plentiful, the fact that each was a wasting
resource might not matter so much. So long as the government could continuously
57 See Ahmed & Perlroth, supra note 15.
58 See, e.g., LILLIAN ABLON & ANDY BOGART, RAND CORP., ZERO DAYS, THOUSANDS
OF NIGHTS: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ZERO-DAY VULNERABILITIES AND THEIR EXPLOITS 52
(2017) (describing the life cycle of vulnerability and exploit).
59 See id. at 2; see also Bellovin et al., supra note 6, at 23; Mayer, supra note 4 (manu-
script at 13–17).
60 See ABLON & BOGART, supra note 58, at 18; see also Schwartz & Knake, supra note
52, at 1, 3 (“[D]isclosing information about a zero day vulnerability so vendors can patch it
could undercut the ability of law enforcement to investigate crimes, intelligence agencies to
gather intelligence, and the military to carry out offensive cyber operations.”).
61 See ABLON & BOGART, supra note 58, at 2–3; see also Zetter, supra note 11.
62 See ABLON & BOGART, supra note 58, at 2–3, 7–8.
63 See Zeitlin, supra note 55, at 750 n.15.
64 See ABLON & BOGART, supra note 58, at 52, 58, 66–67; see also Zeitlin, supra note
55, at 750 n.15.
65 ABLON & BOGART, supra note 58, at 7–8; Ghappour, supra note 10, at 1111 (“When a
criminal or foreign agent accesses a computer hacked by the United States, he may be able to
reverse-engineer the attack in order to use it to attack cyberinfrastructure in the United States.”).
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obtain new zero-days, most likely by buying them on the open market, it could cope
with the risk of loss accompanying each use of malware. The evidence, while in-
complete, suggests to the contrary that zero days are extremely rare. Security company
Symantec periodically releases statistics about vulnerabilities and exploits.66 In
2015, it reported that 54 zero-days were discovered, a dramatic increase from the
prior years, but still quite small when compared to the number of likely targets of
criminal, national security, and intelligence investigations of online activity.67 One
commenter suggests that this number is inflated, because each zero-day is tied to a
particular piece and version of software, meaning the number of truly useful zero-day
vulnerabilities is likely much smaller.68
b. Step Two
These characteristics of information security have given rise to parallel charac-
teristics of government control of the malware it possesses. First, because zero-day
vulnerabilities must be hunted for in clandestine settings and jealously guarded once
found, the national security and intelligence apparatuses of the government tend to
take a central role in these activities.69 Law enforcement agencies will either borrow
malware from their national security counterparts or develop and maintain their own
stockpile of malware under strict controls.70
Second, the decision to allow malware to cross the transom from the national
security to the law enforcement side of the government raises tensions between these
two government roles.71 Most law enforcement activity aims for a public resolu-
tion—indictment and conviction in open court. Criminal defendants are entitled to
discovery including obtaining information about the investigation that led to their
66 See, e.g., 21 SYMANTEC, INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT (2016), https://www
.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/reports/istr-21-2016-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9L
UB-ABWV].
67 Id. at 5.
68 Stephen M. Maurer, A Market-Based Approach to Cyber Defense: Buying Zero-Day
Vulnerabilities, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Mar. 14, 2017), http://thebulletin.org/market
-based-approach-cyber-defense-buying-zero-day-vulnerabilities10621 [https://perma.cc
/V5W6-RJQH].
69 See Schwartz & Knake, supra note 52, at 1–6 (describing government process created
to decide how to handle newly acquired software vulnerabilities).
70 See id.; see also Ghappour, supra note 10, at 1110–11 (discussing inconsistencies
between intelligence agencies and law enforcement approach to vulnerability disclosure and
malware use).
71 See Susan Hennessey & Nicholas Weaver, A Judicial Framework for Evaluating
Network Investigative Techniques, LAWFARE (July 28, 2016, 10:17 AM), https://www.law
fareblog.com/judicial-framework-evaluating-network-investigative-techniques [https://perma
.cc/QXN9-Z3YF] (discussing concerns about the disclosure of secrets through the criminal
discovery process).
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arrest.72 When government malware is used to identify a suspect, that fact is sure to
be revealed through discovery, if not sooner. The sheer fact that malware was used
will often spark an intense hunt in the security community for the vulnerability ex-
ploited by the government, hastening the demise of the particular exploit.73 Even
worse for the government, defense lawyers have learned to request the source code
for the exploit and to seek judicial compulsion for these requests.74 For example, in
the PlayPen case, at least one magistrate judge has ordered the government to produce
the source code, and the government has decided to drop the charges instead.75
Third, the role of national security interests or sensitive law enforcement in
government assure a federal role in the approval of the use of malware by law
enforcement. Despite the vast majority of police conduct that takes place at the state,
county, and local levels, malware is likely to remain the province of the Feds. State
attorneys general or county district attorneys who want to use malware in criminal
cases will doubtless need to coordinate with federal counterparts.76
Fourth, within law enforcement, the decision to use malware will likely reside
with headquarters and not be left to the field. I and others have written about intra-
agency checks on government power in criminal investigations.77 Summarizing this
work briefly, headquarter offices tend to be more conservative and rights-protective
than satellite offices in the field, which tend to be more focused on individual
prosecutions and less worried about ramifications outside a single case or office.78
72 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that with-
holding by prosecutor of any evidence material to guilt or punishment is an unconstitutional
violation of due process); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153–55 (1972)
(holding that withholding evidence of a promise of leniency was material under Brady).
73 See generally Schwartz & Knake, supra note 52, at 3 (discussing how zero-day
vulnerabilities cease to be zero-day when they become publicly known).
74 See, e.g., Order on Procedural History and Case Status in Advance of May 25, 2016
Hearing, United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351-RJB, 2016 WL 337263 (W.D. Wash.
May 18, 2016) (order reviewing procedural history of defendant’s attempt to compel the
government to disclose its N.I.T. code).
75 Joseph Cox, Judge Rules FBI Must Reveal Malware It Used to Hack Over 1,000
Computers, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 18, 2016, 5:02 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com
/en_us/article/jpgmdg/judge-rules-fbi-must-reveal-malware-used-to-hack-over-1000-com
puters-playpen-jay-michaud [https://perma.cc/LXS4-ZL8F]; Lily Hay Newman, The Feds
Would Rather Drop a Child Porn Case Than Give Up a Tor Exploit, WIRED (Mar. 7, 2017,
9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/feds-rather-drop-child-porn-case-give-exploit/
[https://perma.cc/72BY-CBQT].
76 See, e.g., DON’T PANIC, supra note 19, at 6 (stating that “state and local authorities
have access to fewer resources than law enforcement operating at the federal level”); Mayer,
supra note 4 (manuscript at 4) (discussing local police cooperation with the FBI in the
Timberline High School case).
77 See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006); Paul Ohm, Electronic Surveil-
lance Law and the Intra-Agency Separation of Powers, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 269, 270–71 (2012).
78 See generally Ohm, supra note 77.
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In the federal law enforcement system, this division between headquarters and field
exist both in the investigative agencies—most importantly the FBI—as well as the
prosecutorial arm—main Justice versus the U.S. Attorneys offices.79 It is impossible
to fathom that a single FBI field office will ever be in a position to deploy malware
without the full participation of its local U.S. Attorney’s office, and it seems inevita-
ble that in every case, both FBI headquarters and main Justice will exert oversight
as well. These additional layers of oversight add friction and control and, in the main,
make it less likely government malware will be used than if the field office made the
decision on its own.80
2. Encryption, the Darknet, and Malware
The government’s need to use malware to investigate crime is almost always
connected to a target’s successful use of encryption.81 A criminal target or suspect
who communicates without encryption can usually be tracked without resort to
malware.82 To be clear, even without encryption, targets can hide their tracks—for
example, by routing their communications through third-party systems.83 This is
apparently what the teenager implicated in the Timberline High case did, routing his
communications through a compromised system in Italy.84 But the rise of easy-to-
use encryption has been a significant catalyst to law enforcement uses of malware.
79 See generally id.
80 See Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 46) (“[E]xperience with government malware
shows that there is not an identity of interests among components of the executive branch.”).
81 See Ghappour, supra note 10, at 1079 (“Network investigative techniques are especially
useful in the pursuit of criminal suspects who use anonymizing software to obscure their
location.”); Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 6) (“These privacy and security technologies
provide legitimate and important protections. But they also inhibit tried-and-true law en-
forcement techniques.”).
82 See Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 6–7); see also DON’T PANIC, supra note 19,
at 1, 4, 7; David E. Sanger, New Technologies Give Government Ample Means to Track
Suspects, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/01/us
/politics/new-technologies-give-government-ample-means-to-track-suspects-study
-finds.html.
83 See, e.g., Michael Kassner, The Dark Side of Anonymous Remailers, TECHREPUBLIC
(Apr. 9, 2012, 12:19 AM), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/it-security/the-dark-side-of
-anonymous-remailers/ [https://perma.cc/B4D9-UZ8F] (discussing “remailers” where a ser-
vice provider replaces an email address with a pseudonym and sends emails without re-
vealing information).
84 See Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 4–5); Kevin Poulsen, FBI’s Secret Spyware
Tracks Down Teen Who Made Bomb Threats, WIRED (July 18, 2007, 12:00 PM), https://
www.wired.com/2007/07/fbi-spyware/ [https://perma.cc/FY3M-7L7Z]. Another example of
the government’s use of malware that did not include Tor, but rather included an IP address
that originated from a foreign country, was litigated in In re Warrant to Search a Target
Computer at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753 (S.D. Tex. 2013). Magistrate Judge
Stephen Smith denied the government’s requested warrant in that case. See id. at 755.
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a. Step One
Before Tor, those who wanted to hide online activity from law enforcement
officials wielding warrants and subpoenas faced daunting challenges. They could
try to cobble together arcane tools that were not designed to be user friendly, which
could be mastered only by those with technical training.85 If they lacked access to
these tools, they were left to resort to easier-to-use but far less robust approaches,
such as relying on third-party anonymizers like email remailers.86 The third parties
running those services came under the intense scrutiny of law enforcement officials,
and many were forced to cooperate or even had their servers seized.87 The vast
majority of people who wanted to evade government scrutiny turned to solutions
such as webmail accounts with mainstream providers like Gmail or Yahoo, which
essentially act as little more than speed bumps for the police.88
Tor and the darknet significantly recalibrated the arms race between Internet
users and government surveillance authorities. Tor came first, providing robust
encryption designed to protect the source IP address of Internet communications.89
The communications from a user using Tor appear to come from another Tor user’s
IP address, and that user has no way of knowing the true user’s IP address.90
Just as significantly, Tor has become much easier to install and use since it was
launched in 2002.91 In the early days, users had to install several different components
85 See generally Alma Whitten & J. D. Tygar, Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt: A Usability
Evaluation of PGP 5.0, in SECURITY AND USABILITY: DESIGNING SECURE SYSTEMS THAT
PEOPLE CAN USE 669 (Lorrie Faith Cranor & Simson Garfinkel eds., 2005).
86 See, e.g., George F. du Pont, The Time Has Come for Limited Liability for Operators
of True Anonymity Remailers in Cyberspace: An Examination of the Possibilities and Perils,
6 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 175, 191–92 (2001); see also Kassner, supra note 83.
87 See Press Release, May First/People Link, FBI Seizes Server in Attack on Anonymous
Speech (2012), https://mayfirst.org/en/2012/fbi-seizes-server-attack-anonymous-speech/ [https://
perma.cc/5TW3-CNQR]; see also du Pont, supra note 86, at 191–94.
88 See Paul Ohm, Good Enough Privacy, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 44 (describing
widespread use of webmail services which provide limited privacy protection); cf. du Pont,
supra note 86, at 191–94 (describing the ease with which police dismantle or circumvent re-
mailers); Poulsen, supra note 84 (describing a student’s use of a Gmail account and a remailer
to remain anonymous).
89 See Dune Lawrence, The Inside Story of Tor, the Best Internet Anonymity Tool the
Government Ever Built, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 23, 2014, 8:51 PM), https://www
.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-23/tor-anonymity-software-vs-dot-the-national-security
-agency [https://perma.cc/ML9W-MPFC]; see also Tor: Overview, supra note 5.
90 See Lawrence, supra note 89; see also Tor: Overview, supra note 5.
91 See Lawrence, supra note 89; see also Roger Dingledine et al., Tor: The Second-
Generation Onion Router (n.d.), https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/tor-de
sign.pdf [https://perma.cc/BDY4-N2ZP].
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in order to use Tor.92 Each component required tweaking and configuration.93 Today,
Tor comes with an installer familiar to any computer user.94
Perhaps of even greater significance are hidden services, which have been part
of Tor since at least 2003.95 Tor can be used to access ordinary web services on the
publicly routed Internet and web, but hidden services are designed to be accessible
only within the Tor network itself.96 This reduces points of public visibility even
more. For example, when a Tor user accesses a website on the web, that website
sees traffic emanating from an IP address, albeit not the user’s true IP address.97
The more profound effect of hidden services or the darknet is that it empowers
those who want to set up repositories of information or channels of communication
that are not intended to be discovered by the public.98 It is tailor-made for small, secret
groups of individuals who want to evade scrutiny or notoriety. These groups might
serve a salutary purpose—think opponents of authoritarian regimes who want to
organize—or an unsavory purpose—think child pornographers or drug traffickers.99
b. Step Two
The basic effect of Tor and hidden services on criminal investigations is to
render invisible and inaccessible to government searchers the IP addresses of those
they are investigating.100 This significantly disrupts the status quo, because online
investigations involving IP addresses have become nearly routine affairs.101 Even
92 See generally Lawrence, supra note 89; Dingledine et al., supra note 91.
93 See generally Lawrence, supra note 89; Dingledine et al., supra note 91.
94 See What Is Tor Browser?, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html
.en [https://perma.cc/RD2Y-UZ29] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
95 See Lawrence, supra note 89; Andy Greenberg, It’s About to Get Even Easier to Hide
on the Dark Web, WIRED (Jan. 20, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://wired.com/2017/01/get-even
-easier-hide-dark-web [https://perma.cc/EXN3-NPD6].
96 See Lawrence, supra note 89; see also Greenberg, supra note 95.
97 See Lawrence, supra note 89.
98 See id.
99 See id.
100 See Ghappour, supra note 10, at 1091–93 (“Use of the dark web by the perpetrator,
however, renders these conventional evidence collection methods obsolete. Recall that when
someone tunnels though [sic] the dark web to browse a public webpage, his Internet traffic
appears to originate from one of thousands of ‘proxy’ computers rather than the one he is
using. Without the ability to obtain a true location for the targeted device, investigators are
unable to initiate conventional evidence collection protocols.”).
101 See id. at 1090 (“According to the DOJ, use of the dark web by criminals to anonymize
communications makes it ‘impossible for law enforcement’ to pursue criminal suspects.”
(citation omitted)); see also Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 6) (“Investigators used to be
able to subpoena an Internet service provider for an online criminal’s identity; Internet anony-
mization software makes that impossible. Investigators used to be able to serve a search warrant
or wiretap order on a cloud service to obtain a criminal’s online communications; end-to-end
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small police departments have learned how IP addresses can often lead directly to on-
line intermediaries such as ISPs and web hosting providers, entities that have physical
locations and administrators who can feel the pressure of compulsory process.102 A
well-designed hidden service within Tor removes these surveillance pressure points.
The problem is that any crime that can be committed or abetted with Internet
technology can migrate to the darknet; to date, most attention has been paid to child
pornography, but the infamous market known as the Silk Road was even more no-
torious as a place to buy drugs.103 Even though federal agents took down the site in
2013,104 reports today continue to suggest that drug trafficking on the darknet continues
to spread.105 “Increasingly,” says Ahmed Ghappour, “criminals use the dark web to
facilitate crimes traditionally conducted in the physical world, such as currency coun-
terfeiting, drug distribution, child exploitation, human trafficking, arms and ammuni-
tion sales, assassination, and terrorism.”106
Malware can thus be seen as a way to make nearly unsolvable crimes solvable.
Faced with crime on the darknet, the choices available to the police are limited and
cumbersome. If the darknet service provides a method for user-to-user communica-
tion, officers can go undercover, hoping to infiltrate a criminal conspiracy and trick
targets into divulging identifying information. Given the way online services can
enable criminal activity at scale, undercover techniques like these are likely to get
at a tiny fraction of criminal behavior. The police can also hope for a lucky break.
Luckily, luck seems not to be in short supply. At least three notorious darknet sites
have been shut down thanks only to the sloppy behavior of their owners, and the
tendency for the Internet to remember everything ever posted online.107
encryption makes that impossible. Investigators used to be able to seize a criminal’s computer
and smartphone and search their data contents; device encryption makes that impossible.”).
102 See Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 4–5); see also du Pont, supra note 86, at
191–94 (describing remailer administrators succumbing to law enforcement).
103 See United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Ghappour,
supra note 10, at 1077–78; see also, e.g., Cox, supra note 3 (discussing the government’s
unprecedented malware attack in pursuing child pornography crimes).
104 Kim Zetter, How the Feds Took Down the Silk Road Drug Wonderland, WIRED (Nov. 18,
2013, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/11/silk-road/ [https://perma.cc /T569-8HKL].
105 Nathaniel Popper, Opioid Dealers Embrace the Dark Web to Send Deadly Drugs by
Mail, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/10/business/dealbook
/opioid-dark-web-drug-overdose.html.
106 Ghappour, supra note 10, at 1090 (citations omitted).
107 See, e.g., Ian Burrows, Alexandre Cazes: Who Was the AlphaBay Founder and How
Did Authorities Catch Him?, ABC NEWS (July 21, 2017, 10:14 AM) (Austl.), http://www
.abc.net.au/news/2017-07-21/who-was-alphabay-founder-alexandre-cazes/8730680 [https://
perma.cc/QBM6-FKL3] (“It appears Cazes was ultimately brought undone by his own mistake
when left [sic] his personal email address visible online.”); Alex Hern, Five Stupid Things
Dread Pirate Roberts Did to Get Arrested, GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2013, 4:17 PM), https://www
.theguardian.com/technology/2013/oct/03/five-stupid-things-dread-pirate-roberts-did-to-get
-arrested [https://perma.cc/KEL2-V8L5]; Graham Templeton, Dark Market Massacre: FBI
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3. Tailoring, Deploying, and Monitoring Malware
The prior two sections looked at the investigative dynamics influencing whether
and when to deploy malware in criminal investigations. Different dynamics impli-
cate how malware must be deployed and controlled, once the decision to do so has
been made.
First, unlike the routinized IP address investigation it replaces, each use of malware
is far more idiosyncratic and bespoke. Second, malware must be carefully monitored
over an extended period of time, requiring a technical support staff and infrastructure.
a. Step One
From what we can glean, the PlayPen virus probably did not exploit a zero-day
vulnerability. Popular versions of the Tor software came pre-bundled with the same
version of the Mozilla Firefox browser.108 For some reason, these bundles did not
provide an easy-to-use, much less fully automated, patch update system, meaning
many Tor users were using an outdated version with well-known vulnerabilities.109
Similarly, the FBI’s controversial attempts to compel Apple to help it break into
the phone of San Bernardino shooter Syed Rizwan Farook turned on the fact that
Farook’s phone was an iPhone 5c, running a particular subversion of version 9 of
the iOS operating system.110 This fact dictated the possibilities of both the FBI’s at-
tempts to guess the phone’s passcode—the controversy litigated in federal court—
as well as the reported exploit the FBI ultimately used to access the phone—ending
the litigation.111
Shuts Down Silk Road 2.0 and Dozens More Tor Websites, EXTREMETECH (Nov. 8, 2014,
8:09 AM), http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/193821-dark-market-massacre-fbi-shuts
-down-silk-road-2-0-and-400-other-tor-websites [https://perma.cc/5EQT-YHAK] (“[W]eb de-
veloper Blake Benthall has been charged with running the Silk Road 2, and if guilty it seems
he went down for the exact same reason as . . . Ross Ulbricht before him: he was stupid.”).
108 See What Is Tor Browser?, supra note 94; see also Kevin Poulsen, FBI Admits It Con-
trolled Tor Servers Behind Mass Malware Attack, WIRED (Sept. 13, 2013, 4:17 PM), http://
www.wired.com/2013/09/freedom-hosting-fbi/ [https://perma.cc/PX5B-TK63].
109 See Poulsen, supra note 108.
110 See Laurie Segall et al., FBI Says It Has Cracked Terrorist’s iPhone Without Apple’s
Help, CNN MONEY (Mar. 29, 2016, 9:36 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/28/news
/companies/fbi-apple-iphone-case-cracked/index.html [https://perma.cc/X9WV-8BHL]; Kim
Zetter, New Documents Solve a Few Mysteries in the Apple-FBI Saga, WIRED (Mar. 11,
2016, 4:01 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/new-documents-solve-mysteries-apple-fbi
-saga/ [https://perma.cc/R849-GBZW].
111 See Government’s Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist
Agents in Search; Memorandum of Points & Authorities; Declaration of Christopher Pluhar;
Exhibit, In re Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant
on a Black Lexus IS300, Cal. License Plate 35KGD203, No. 15-0451M (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16,
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These examples highlight a typical pattern when the police use malware. A key
step is the selection of precisely the right exploit for the job, one married to the precise
version, perhaps down to the sub-sub-sub-version, of the precise piece of software
known, or suspected, to be used by the target.112 “Because exploits must be exquisitely
tailored to particular versions and patch levels, using the wrong exploit frequently
results in failures, and can even raise alerts or cause suspicious crashes.”113 There is
never just one catch-all piece of malware that will work across a broad number of tar-
get systems and software versions; the choice of the exploit, the method of delivery,
and the techniques used for reporting need to be tailored to each particular case.114
Each investigation’s tailoring is unlikely to be generalizable to other cases,
again because of the wasting resource nature of malware.115 The next target investi-
gated is unlikely to be running precisely the same version of the same software as
the one that worked this time.116
In addition, malware requires a large team of technical experts backed by a robust
technical infrastructure to operate.117 Malware needs to be delivered with pinpoint
accuracy; for example, in the “watering hole” style of delivery, only those users whose
communications match the prespecified indicia of culpability should receive the
malware.118 It might mean that on a large server dedicated generally to pornography,
only those who visit a particular forum should receive the malware.119 Or perhaps it
should be sent only to those who attempt to download an image file in a given forum.
Once malware has successfully exploited a vulnerability, it begins to collect
information from the target’s computer or network, and it needs to transmit that
information back to a police monitoring system.120
2016); see also Complaint, Associated Press v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No. 16-cv-
1850, 2016 WL 4990082 (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2016); Segall et al., supra note 110.
112 See Bellovin et al., supra note 6, at 36–37 (“To remotely access a machine, an attacker
generally needs to know the IP and/or MAC addresses of the machine, the operating system
(including exact version and patch level), what services are running on the machine, which
communications ports are open, what applications are installed, and whether the system con-
tains any known vulnerabilities.” (footnotes omitted)).
113 Id. at 36.
114 See id. at 36–37; Zetter, supra note 11.
115 See supra notes 38–80 and accompanying text.
116 See Bellovin et al., supra note 6, at 33 (explaining how three different targets might
require three different exploits).
117 See id. at 40 (describing the need for “supporting infrastructure” including “encrypted
channels to the investigators,” a “command-and-control subsystem,” and “concealment
mechanisms”).
118 See Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 13–15, 61) (“The government may need to
impose extra conditions on its watering hole delivery—requiring more than merely visiting
the site—to ensure probable cause.”).
119 See id.
120 See, e.g., id. (manuscript at 16–17) (describing “execution” and “reporting” in govern-
ment malware operations).
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Sometimes this happens at a single moment of time. Like a search of a home,
the point of some malware might be to exploit a vulnerability, deploy some payload
that, for example, searches an entire hard drive for certain types of evidence, and
“phone home” once with whatever it finds.121 Like the finite home search, this might
take minutes, or even hours or longer to accomplish, but there is a single, discrete
moment in the future when the search may be deemed completed.122
In other cases, the malware will conduct ongoing surveillance—sometimes it
will literally be a wiretapping device such as a packet sniffer or a keystroke logger—
and it will reside on the hard drive until it is disabled.123 It might phone home regularly
or even continuously, constantly updating a police dossier of what it has learned.124
Or it might phone home at one point in the future, uploading a bundle of information
acquired over time.125
b. Step Two
Because each case presents a unique and idiosyncratic technical situation, and be-
cause malware must be carefully deployed and monitored over time, malware investiga-
tions will tend to be resource-heavy and hard to standardize into routine investigations.
This does not seem to be a temporary situation. It is likely that the non-routine
nature of malware investigation will be true in the near- to midterm. Because of the
adversarial, arms race nature of vulnerability and exploit, the police find themselves
trapped in a mouse wheel of innovation, forced to throw out the playbook and start
fresh with each patch. Short of some major and far-fetched advance in artificial
intelligence—a super-tool that can find new vulnerabilities and craft exploits to take
advantage of them—this will never become a one-click style of operation.
In addition, malware will require the coordination of a large support team to
deploy and monitor. Small, satellite offices, particularly at the state level, where re-
sources might be far more limited than at the federal level, and where technological
expertise is often scarce, will find it difficult to support the use of malware.126 The need
to use malware in some types of cases will nudge law enforcement to larger, better
supported investigative units and agencies. It takes a police village to use govern-
ment malware.
121 See id. (manuscript at 17).
122 See id. (manuscript at 66–67) (discussing malware cases in which the government
requested permission to collect information from the infected computer for thirty days).
123 See, e.g., id. (manuscript at 17) (discussing, in part, malware that remains present and
operational on suspects’ computers).
124 See id.; see also Zeitlin, supra note 55, at 751.
125 See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 17, 64–68).
126 See Bellovin et al., supra note 6, at 2 (questioning whether local and state law enforce-
ment agencies are capable of developing and utilizing malware); see also DON’T PANIC,
supra note 19, at 6 (describing state authorities’ lack of federal resources); Mayer, supra note
4 (manuscript at 4–5) (describing local law enforcement’s difficulty with malware, thus re-
quiring FBI assistance).
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Obviously, nothing prevents smaller units with fewer resources from trying to
deploy malware. I predict that smaller units will try to use this tool, but when they do,
they will quickly be reminded of why broader support is necessary, as they realize
the mistakes they make without support. These mistakes might be revealed during
the operation, when the malware they use is detected or directed at innocent by-
standers. If not then, they will probably learn their lesson during prosecution, when
their methods are challenged or subjected to discovery.
C. Summarizing the Constraints and Incentives
Let us summarize the various “step two” assertions about what the dynamics of
malware do to constrain and incentivize police conduct. The decision to use malware
will often require consultation with—and even permission from—the national security
and intelligence arms of the government.127 These branches of government are likely
to disfavor law enforcement uses, because of the inherently public nature of a criminal
prosecution and because of the tools defense lawyers have to force transparency of
investigative tools and steps.128
These, and other, dynamics will tend to subject requests to use malware to thor-
ough, burdensome, bureaucratic review. These review decisions are likely to involve
the headquarters of both the prosecutors and investigators, rather than leave the deci-
sion to the field, and will usually necessitate the participation of federal agencies.129
All of this bureaucracy and review will disincentivize the routine use of malware.
Malware will most often be used in cases involving targets who have hidden their
tracks, particularly using robust encryption, and thereby thwarted alternative, less
burdensome, routine investigative approaches.
Finally, the need to match exploit to vulnerability across the wide sweep of
computer software will prevent malware from becoming a routine process. Every
use of malware will feel bespoke and idiosyncratic, giving rise to unpredictable odds
of success.130 Before we turn, in Part III, to how these constraints and incentives
clarify various law and policy debates, consider how they contrast with the investi-
gative dynamics of a few other emerging surveillance technologies.
D. Compared to Other Surveillance Technologies
These distinctive features of malware—the idea of a stockpiled exploit as a
wasting resource, the role of encryption, and the burdensome and tailored nature of
malware investigations—distinguish this class of tools from other seemingly similar
surveillance technologies. Let us compare two other technologies reportedly being
127 See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 45–48) (discussing interagency surveil-
lance constraints).
128 See supra notes 69–79 and accompanying text.
129 See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text.
130 See Bellovin et al., supra note 6, at 33, 36.
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used by law enforcement officials: cell-site simulators (e.g., StingRay devices) and
facial recognition software.131 Very few of the conclusions we draw about malware
apply in either of these contexts, supporting the idea that malware presents distinctive
issues, concerns, and solutions. Comparing these other technologies to malware further
demonstrates the operation (and the power) of the investigative dynamics approach.
Cell-site simulators are designed to masquerade as legitimate telecommunica-
tions infrastructure, in a sense “tricking” target cell phones into revealing personal
or sensitive information, such as a unique identifier (e.g., IMSI number) or the content
of communications.132
Cell-site simulators take advantage of the relative openness of cell phone
standards. Cell phones rely on publicly available standards promulgated by groups
such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU).133 One reason standards
like these can be spoofed is the need to provide interoperability: a cell phone user does
not want her phone calls dropped if the only tower within range is a competitor to her
telephone company or when she is traveling internationally. Providers can provide
roaming services in those cases, meaning her phone will be willing to at least com-
municate with towers not provided by her own service.134
Cell-site simulators also take advantage of the need for devices to be backwards
compatible, meaning capable of communicating with towers using old, outdated
standards.135 This means that even if a cellphone utilizes a harder-to-spoof new stan-
dard, say a 4G or even 5G standard, the phone can still fallback to a 2G or 3G
standard when that is all a tower appears to support.136
These standards dynamics—openness and the ability to force a fallback—differ
widely from the “wasting resource” of malware. Cell-site simulators make them-
selves indistinguishable from legitimate network activity, meaning there is nothing
a target can do to avoid the surveillance.137 This means that law enforcement agents
will feel no natural disinclination to using cell-site simulators as often as they are
allowed.
131 See Street Level Surveillance: Cell-Site Simulators, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/sls/tech/cell-site-simulators [https://perma.cc/TS9Y-XG2V] (last visited
Dec. 4, 2017).
132 See id.
133 See generally Welcome to ITU-R, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU
-R/information/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/R9UH-LCS7] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
134 See Understanding Wireless Telephone Coverage Areas, FED. COMM. COMMISSION,
https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/understanding-wireless-telephone-coverage-areas
[https://perma.cc/F8VJ-STJ3] (last updated Sept. 8, 2017).
135 See generally Kim Zetter, Turns Out Police Stingray Spy Tools Can Indeed Record
Calls, WIRED (Oct. 28, 2015, 3:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/stingray-govern
ment-spy-tools-can-record-calls-new-documents-confirm/ [https://perma.cc/4338-Q93F].
136 See id.; see also Lauren Walker, Fake Cell Towers Allow the NSA and Police to Keep
Track of You, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 5, 2014, 11:28 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/what-cell
-ls-those-ominous-phony-towers-268589 [https://perma.cc/M5EP-TBXW].
137 See Zetter, supra note 135.
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Next, consider the investigative dynamics of facial recognition.138 Any image
or video captured containing a person’s face can be mathematically compared to
other images or videos containing faces to search for a match, an indication that the
person in both images is the same person.139 If one of the image sources ties faces
to identities, say a registry of driver’s license photographs, this is a potent tool for
identifying otherwise anonymous people.
The dynamics of facial recognition are more like the dynamics of cell-site
simulators than the dynamics of malware in several key ways. Most importantly,
there is no structural barrier to the repeated use of the technology.140
A key dynamic of facial recognition makes it even more prone to unfettered
government abuse than cell-site simulator technology. Every step in facial recogni-
tion occurs at a distance, without touching any device belonging to the target.141
Malware interacts directly with the target’s computer, and a cell-site simulator com-
municates directly with the target’s cell phone.142 In either case, there is a possibility
that the affected device will notice, report, or log the government interaction. In stark
contrast, once a face is captured—perhaps by a hidden camera—the rest of the interac-
tion happens solely on government systems.143
This distinctive dynamic of facial recognition suggests that law enforcement
might feel tempted to use the technology even in cases of minor consequence or
priority. Divorced from the even somewhat remote possibility that a target will
detect the government conduct, there seems to be no intrinsic reason to confine the
technology to serious crimes. One can imagine using facial recognition to target
nuisance crimes like littering or jaywalking. It’s hard to imagine doing the same for
cell-site simulator or malware technology. The advantage of the investigative dynamics
approach is giving a rigorous methodology to identifying otherwise merely intuitive
conclusions like these.
III. IMPLICATIONS
This brings us to what I described as the practical payoff of the investigative
dynamics approach—the implications for law and policy debates. Understanding the
ideas that malware is a wasting resource, the relationship between encrypted ser-
vices and law enforcement use of malware, and the burdensome nature of malware
138 See Clare Garvie, Alvaro Bedoya & Jonathan Frankle, The Perpetual Line-Up: Un-





142 See Ghappour, supra note 10, at 1079–80, 1095–97; Street Level Surveillance: Cell-
Site Simulators, supra note 131.
143 See Garvie et al., supra note 138.
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investigation contributes to many important debates. Every realistic use of malware
by law enforcement is a Fourth Amendment search. The focus on investigative dynam-
ics might help the misguided courts who have botched this question realize their
errors. Additionally, since the government already adheres to de facto procedures
resembling so-called “super-warrant” requirements, Congress should consider impos-
ing those requirements de jure, imposing a welcome measure of privacy protection
without disrupting the status quo much. Finally, malware can never restore what law
enforcement has lost in the so-called “going dark” shift to encrypted services.
A. Is the Use of Malware a Search?
Given the technological and bureaucratic conditions described above, courts
should understand that just about every use of government malware they will ever
encounter must be a Fourth Amendment search, even under a very conservative,
government-friendly reading of the applicable cases.
To be clear, I am not making an impossibility proof. Of course the government
could use malware to access a computer in a way that would not be deemed a search.144
But the investigative dynamics explain why they would never feel the need to do so.
Let’s clear some ground by taking a few pieces of Fourth Amendment doctrine
off the table. First, by definition, the use of malware by the government is an act of
self-help, in which the government reaches out directly to the target’s account or
computer.145 The government neither makes direct requests of or interactions with
third-party intermediaries nor retrieves any information stored by a third party, mean-
ing third-party doctrine cases like Smith v. Maryland146 and United States v. Miller147
are completely inapposite.148
Second, under the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test, the subjective
prong presents no analytical hindrance to a finding of search in cases like these.149
By definition, government malware will almost always be used in cases like investi-
gations of the darknet, cases in which the target has expressly sought out and installed
software designed to protect privacy and, with the protection of that software, ex-
pressly sought out a service configured to protect privacy.
With these prongs out of the way, the essential Fourth Amendment question
remaining is the objective prong of Katz: is society prepared to accept as reasonable
144 See Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 54) (describing the government collection of
data that is broadcast onto public networks and acknowledging that no warrant is required
in such cases); Ahmed & Perlroth, supra note 15.
145 Ghappour, supra note 10, at 1079–80, 1095–97; Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 39).
146 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
147 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
148 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46; Miller, 425 U.S. at 437–38; see also Ghappour, supra
note 10, at 1079–80, 1095–97; Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 39).
149 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step:
The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 113 (2015).
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an individual’s expectation of privacy against exploitation by malware?150 It is hard
to imagine any line of argument that would answer this question in the negative, as
the investigative dynamics help us illuminate.
Focus in particular on a piece of information often sought in malware cases: the
target’s computer’s IP address. A target who is not using Tor shares his IP address
with every Internet-connected computer he comes into contact with while surfing
the web, sending email, or using an app.151 Decades of law enforcement tradecraft
have evolved to make these IP addresses visible to law enforcement investigators
without requiring any use of malware whatsoever.152
Given the investigative dynamics of malware—the bureaucratic hurdles, inter-
actions with national security agencies, and eventual challenge by criminal defense
counsel—no reasonable officer with an ounce of self-preservation would choose the
tool when “Ordinary Tradecraft Pattern X” is available instead. The dynamics
themselves dictate that almost any malware situation arises precisely because the IP
address sought has been hidden away from public scrutiny.
The proper doctrinal category for this kind of government access, then, are those
cases that have likened computers to closed containers.153 Using computer forensics
software to analyze the bytes stored on a hard drive or using a packet sniffer to
examine the flow of information across a network has constituted a search.154 So too
should courts treat the act of “opening” a computer on the darknet with malware,
rooting around that computer’s hard drive, and transmitting what is found back to
the police, as searches of closed containers, requiring probable cause, a search
warrant, and judicial review.
This analysis has led scholars like Orin Kerr and Jonathan Mayer to conclude
that the malware in the PlayPen case conducted Fourth Amendment searches.155 It
is of course noteworthy that a few courts have concluded otherwise.156 But those
150 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring); see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 740.
151 See Lawrence, supra note 89.
152 See Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 6) (describing how law enforcement historically
obtained target data).
153 See, e.g., United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d 929, 936 (W.D. Tex. 1998); People
v. Gall, 30 P.3d 145, 153 (Colo. 2001); see also Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment
Aspects of Computer Searches and Seizures: A Perspective and a Primer, 75 MISS. L.J. 193,
196 (2005).
154 See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 956–57 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)
(discussing computer forensic examination as a search).
155 Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 39); Orin Kerr, Opinion, Remotely Accessing an




156 See Joseph Cox, Should Hacking a Tor User to Get an IP Address Require a Warrant?,
VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Sept. 21, 2016, 12:30 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/arti
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courts are simply wrong. The judges who authored those opinions betray a funda-
mental misunderstanding of the technology involved, and even some prosecutors
have disclaimed relying on their reasoning.157 Their errors are picked apart well by
the work just cited and deserve no further serious attention in this Article.158
B. De Facto Superwarrant Protections
Several commentators have recommended the imposition of wiretap-like,
superwarrant procedural protections for any use of malware for law enforcement
purposes.159 Congress could enact a new law, for example, perhaps modeled on the
Wiretap Act, that required more than the baseline requirements of probable cause
and review by a detached and neutral magistrate before the police could be granted
a warrant to deploy malware.160
Anytime Congress extends obligations beyond merely probable cause and
judicial review, it must consider the impact on criminal law enforcement. The study
of early malware cases like Timberline High and PlayPen, suggest that law enforce-
ment has already been exercising a de facto superwarrant procedure. Supplementing
this study with an examination of the technical architecture of law enforcement
malware and the bureaucratic safeguards that flow from this architecture suggest that
this track record is not merely a coincidence nor the product of self-imposed con-
straint. It suggests the more tantalizing prospect that these additional procedures and
protections are intrinsic, or nearly so, to the use of this kind of investigative tool.
If true, this suggests that a new legislative law imposing some or all of the menu
of procedures in the Wiretap Act would be far less than a catastrophe for law enforce-
ment. To be clear, any proposal to impose new procedures is likely to inspire opposition
from law enforcement—more oversight and procedures are worse than fewer—but
I think this opposition will not be rooted in a well-founded fear of lost cases. Con-
sider three obligations from the Wiretap Act that are typically regarded as important,
but onerous: necessity, internal review, and predicate crimes.161 The government has
already imposed forms of all three of these obligations when it has deployed malware
in criminal investigations. The analysis of the dynamics suggests that this might be
an intrinsic feature of the use of this tool, meaning Congress has less reason to fear
the law enforcement impact of enshrining this obligation by statute.
cle/ezpq5a/should-hacking-a-tor-user-to-get-an-ip-address-require-a-warrant [https://perma
.cc/5LWD-ZSVV].
157 See Kerr, supra note 155; Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 9, 28, 46).
158 See Kerr, supra note 155; Mayer, supra note 4.
159 See, e.g., Bankston, supra note 16; Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 75–79).
160 See Bankston, supra note 16.
161 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2518 (2012); Paul Ohm, The Surveillance Regulation Toolkit:
Thinking Beyond Probable Cause, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE LAW
491 (David Gray & Stephen E. Henderson eds., 2017).
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In the Wiretap Act, the necessity rule requires the officer applying for the super-
warrant to provide “a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investi-
gative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.”162 The judge to which the ap-
plication has been made must “determine[ ] on the basis of the facts submitted by the
applicant” the same.163
The design of darknet hidden services operates like a particularly fiendish law
professor’s final exam hypothetical about necessity in a digital age. If the very act
of downloading or transmitting content online is illegal, by routing this content
through a darknet service, the operators and users of the service are all but ensuring
that other investigative approaches would be “unlikely to succeed.” That conclusion
flows directly from the technological architecture of the darknet.
Once again, I offer no impossibility proof. For virtually any crime abetted by
a darknet service, there is a theoretical possibility that the crime might be solvable
using a law enforcement technique that does not require the deployment of malware.
For example, servers might be misconfigured, revealing the true IP address of the
server or a particular user.164 In fact, the only reason the FBI was able to launch its
malware in PlayPen en masse was due to this kind of misconfiguration, which revealed
the IP address of the server, but not the individual users.165
As another alternative possibility, because the PlayPen server provided a chat-
room capability, the FBI could have tried to use conventional undercover techniques
to reveal the identity of users.166 This would have been a far slower, far less likely
to succeed approach, one which again would not have worked en masse.
The text and case law relating to the Wiretap Act’s necessity requirement
suggest that these types of speculative alternatives are not enough to defeat neces-
sity.167 The text requires only that the alternatives “reasonably appear” insufficient,
162 § 2518(1)(c).
163 § 2518(3)(c).
164 The big break in the investigation into the Silk Road website occurred when an IRS
agent found an early mention of the website using Google searches traced back eventually
to Ross Ulbricht, who was ultimately convicted. See Nathaniel Popper, The Tax Sleuth Who
Took Down a Drug Lord, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/27
/business/dealbook/the-unsung-tax-agent-who-put-a-face-on-the-silk-road.html?_r=0.
165 Joseph Cox, An Admin’s Foolish Errors Helped the FBI Unmask Child Porn Site
‘Playpen,’ VICE: MOTHERBOARD (May 16, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com
/en_us/article/nz7e8x/an-admins-foolish-errors-helped-the-fbi-unmask-child-porn-site-play
pen [https://perma.cc/KK8X-Y4WN].
166 See Ghappour, supra note 10, at 1090–95; Kim Zetter, Everything We Know About
How the FBI Hacks People, WIRED (May 15, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016
/05/history-fbis-hacking/ [https://perma.cc/XQ7Z-54HQ] (detailing the history of FBI hacks).
167 See § 2518(1)(c), (3)(c); see also, e.g., United States v. McGuire, 307 F.3d 1192,
1196–97 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[L]aw enforcement officials need not exhaust every conceivable
alternative before obtaining a wiretap.” (citing United States v. Brone, 792 F.2d 1504, 1506
(9th Cir. 1986))).
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two words that soften the standard in favor of law enforcement conclusions about
the alternatives.168 The standard also excuses officials from even attempting alterna-
tives that reasonably appear “to be too dangerous,” which courts have interpreted
to include the danger of being discovered.169
Congress, of course, is free to write a stricter (or looser) necessity provision in
a new statute governing the use of malware. But even if it does, the investigative
dynamics suggest the use of malware in darknet cases will be found to satisfy
necessity even under a stricter standard: the government has a strong disincentive
to use malware except as a last resort.170 Each use risks revealing a previously un-
disclosed zero-day vulnerability, destroying the stockpiled exploit, both by releasing
the code into the wild and through the operation of the discovery process.171
For these same reasons, the government is not likely to be hindered by a new,
statutorily mandated requirement of intra-agency review and approval for each use of
malware. Congress might again follow the Wiretap Act, which requires the approval
of a relatively high-ranking Department of Justice official prior to any application by
federal agents of wiretap authorization.172 Similarly, the same provision of the Wiretap
Act restricts the use of wiretaps of wire or oral communications to investigating
crimes found on a, admittedly long, list of predicate crimes, such as certain crimes
relating to terrorism or drug dealing.173
The dynamics of law enforcement malware once again suggest that neither of
these requirements would change the status quo for the government, which already
exercises de facto intra-agency review. In fact, if there are agents or prosecutors in
the field who would be inclined to try to use malware without first consulting FBI
headquarters or main Justice, they would likely do so against the best wishes of the
central authorities. If true, a Congressional mandate might be welcomed by the
center of these agencies, as a helpful way to exert control over the periphery.
One factor that headquarters is already likely to consider for each proposed use
of malware is the seriousness of the underlying offense. We have at least circum-
stantial evidence of this, as the cases we know about involve bomb threats and child
exploitation, which happen to fall within the crimes defined in the Wiretap Act.174
168 § 2518(1)(c).
169 Id.; see, e.g., McGuire, 307 F.3d at 1197.
170 See supra Section II.B.1.
171 See supra Section II.B.1.
172 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (requiring the authorization of “[t]he Attorney General, Deputy
Attorney General, Associate Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General, any acting
Assistant Attorney General, or any Deputy Assistant Attorney General or acting Deputy
Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division or National Security Division specially
designated by the Attorney General” before an application for judicial authorization to wire-
tap wire or oral communications).
173 Id.
174 See § 2516(1)(c); see also Cox, supra note 1; Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript at 4–5).
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We have yet to learn of the use of malware in a case that does not involve a crime
on the list or that otherwise seems relatively insignificant or petty.175
The study of the dynamics of law enforcement’s use of malware can give Congress
some assurance that the burden on law enforcement of at least some superwarrant
requirements will not create an undue burden on the government’s ability to fight
crime. In the face of arguments made by others—arguments with which I agree but
that fall outside the scope of this Article—Congress should strongly consider acting
to prevent the abuse of these tools.
C. Malware and Going Dark
This Article’s analysis of the dynamics of law enforcement uses of malware can
also contribute to the public debate about the impact of the rise of easy-to-use
encryption on government surveillance capabilities, commonly called the “going
dark” debate.176
Most importantly, this analysis confirms what others have already observed: the
use of encryption by surveillance targets makes criminal investigation more difficult
and less efficient.177 Because each use of malware comes at the heavy cost of the
loss of an investigative tool, and because this cost gives rise to institutional checks
both within a law enforcement organization and from other agencies and branches,
it is destined to remain an exceptional, “break glass in emergency” sort of tool. It
seems implausible that any particular piece of malware will likely become a tool of
routine crime fighting.
This suggests that malware can never operate at scale. Each proposed use will
be seen as a great burden. Officers will feel great pressure to find ways to make their
cases without resorting to malware. This is similar to how many law enforcement
agents feel about wiretaps—the superwarrant requirements imposed on them by Title
III and state wiretapping laws make wiretaps often not worth the hassle.178 Accord-
ing to annual reports compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, law enforcement agents at every level—federal, state, and local—cumulatively
apply for no more than 6,000 wiretap orders per year, meaning this kind of authority
is sought in a tiny fraction of criminal cases investigated each year.179
175 Cf. Ahmed & Perlroth, supra note 15.
176 See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., EXPLORING ENCRYPTION AND POTENTIAL
MECHANISMS FOR AUTHORIZED GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO PLAINTEXT: PROCEEDINGS OF A
WORKSHOP (2016); DON’T PANIC, supra note 19; Peter G. Neumann et al., Inside Risks: Keys
Under Doormats, COMM. ACM, Oct. 2015, at 24, 24–25.
177 See generally Bellovin et al., supra note 6, at 30–31; Mayer, supra note 4 (manuscript
at 6).
178 Cf. Wiretap Reports 2016, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/wire
tap-report-2016 [https://perma.cc/3D8K-6AKH] (last updated Dec. 31, 2016) (reporting 3,168
wiretaps authorized in 2016 and providing historical comparisons).
179 Id.
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Malware, then, will never adequately replace what has been lost—the orderly,
straightforward sort of online crime investigation that had developed over the past
few decades.180 The victim brings you an IP address, which you type into an online
database, which leads you to an ISP, to which you send a subpoena, resulting in a home
address, which you ask a judge for permission to search.181 This type of investigation
is straightforward, reproducible, and predictable. It can be boiled down into advice
in a police manual or taught in a daylong seminar.
The malware equivalent of this story is far less predictable or orderly. Criminal
activity is encountered on the darknet. The police can know neither the identity nor
location of the person hosting the service or anybody using the service. If they are
lucky, they can gain insight into the software being used by some of the partici-
pants—a given operating system, a given browser, or, even better, the particular
versions being used. Then, they must obtain precisely the right malware that will
work on a vulnerability present in some of that software, which will probably require
them to justify the investigation to their headquarters, prosecutor, prosecutor’s head-
quarters, and a judge. After all of this, they will launch the malware, and hope it works.
If anything, this recitation makes the process seem even easier than it is in reality.
The PlayPen case was assisted by a few lucky breaks and extraordinary actions: the
server was misconfigured for a brief time, revealing a true IP address, which pointed
to a server in North Carolina.182 A foreign law enforcement agency happened to
notice this, and was connected well enough to international law enforcement
networks to report back to the United States.183 Even then, the malware reportedly
took advantage of the fact that an old software vulnerability in the Firefox browser
that had already been patched was not yet fixed in the older versions of Firefox
bundled in the Tor browser version that many PlayPen users used.184 PlayPen required
extraordinary effort and some dumb luck. The case would have been impossible
without all of this.
Consider a counterfactual: what kind of changes would it require to allow the
police to use malware at scale, to come closer to replicating the kind of relatively
frictionless investigation that had become easy prior to the spread of strong encryp-
tion? Again, the investigative dynamics analysis in Part II can help answer this
question. Because malware is a wasting resource, the government would need to
180 Ghappour, supra note 10, at 1094 (“With no other leads, the investigation grinds to a
halt.”).
181 See id. at 1090–95.
182 See Cox, supra note 165.
183 Id.
184 See Joseph Cox, The FBI May Be Sitting on a Firefox Vulnerability, VICE: MOTHER-
BOARD (Apr. 13, 2016, 2:25 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/aekeq4/the-fbi
-may-be-sitting-on-a-firefox-vulnerability [https://perma.cc/B7DT-KFHW]; see also Joseph
Cox, The FBI Used a ‘Non-Public’ Vulnerability to Hack Suspects on Tor, VICE: MOTHER-
BOARD (Nov. 29, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/kb7kza/the
-fbi-used-a-non-public-vulnerability-to-hack-suspects-on-tor [https://perma.cc/DE5S-LEFQ].
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find a steady stream of new vulnerabilities and a way to develop a steady stream of
corresponding new exploits. The two ways to do this is to develop them in-house or
buy them on the market. In this counterfactual, the FBI would probably need to do
both, spending billions of dollars on hiring an in-house virus writing developer
corps and enriching the coffers of vulnerability and exploit security firms.
That alone would not be enough. Because malware must be monitored after
deployment, the police would likely need to develop a sophisticated process of
controlled delivery and monitoring of these tools. Most likely, this would require a
centralized technological and bureaucratic infrastructure—perhaps one run out of
FBI headquarters. As more criminal activity moved to the darknet, this would mean
crime fighting would migrate from state and local police agencies and FBI field
offices to centralized control.
Now consider potential risks of police abuse that are exacerbated by all of these
necessary structural changes. Our government would employ dozens, if not hundreds,
of virus writers. It would underwrite massive new efforts in vulnerability detection.
It would centralize power and control of many criminal investigations in FBI
headquarters. It would build an unprecedented network of surveillance apparatuses.
You might find some of these to be positive developments. For example, you
might see the increased activity in vulnerability detection resulting in an overall
increase in cybersecurity.
But I find great risks in this story as well. Because the vulnerability-writing and
purchasing activity would be classified, it would shift a significant component of
crime fighting into darker shadows. And the centralization of decisions to deploy
malware will also concentrate currently dispersed power in one agency’s hands.
I thus find much to worry about in the world in which FBI malware becomes a
primary tool for law enforcement rather than a last resort. But even those who agree
with this assessment might find it an acceptable risk in the broader “going dark” de-
bate for two reasons. First, if the alternative is a mandate for weakened encryption,
this might be better. Second, do we really have any choice? Even if the government
tries to mandate a weakened encryption standard, unless every government goes along
with the mandate, and even then, unless we could enforce these mandates, easy-to-
use, strong crypto is probably here to stay.
CONCLUSION
When I first sat down to write about the FBI’s use of malware, I expected to
write a screed against unchecked and abusive government power. I had written
articles like that in the past, and I didn’t see why this time should be any different.185
185 See, e.g., Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J.
1309 (2012); Ohm, supra note 7, at 1516 (“Congress should instead seek other ways to
balance police need with privacy . . . .”).
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The PlayPen case seemed rich with possibility to expose the massive abuse by the
police of a terrifying new technology.
I surprised myself, then, by finding myself less than troubled by what I learned
about PlayPen. To be clear, the government abused its power in this case. It is not clear
to me that the judge who signed the warrant had power under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure to allow this search.186 The fact that this single warrant was used
to effect maybe thousands of searches in computers around the globe seems to strain
the Constitution’s guarantee that search warrants will be supported with particularity.187
But fundamentally, I think the government faced incredible barriers in investi-
gating an important crime, one with truly vulnerable victims. It recognized that the
power it sought was exceptional and subjected the novel investigative approach to
searching headquarters review. In fact, it checked many of the boxes we would
expect the government to need to check if faced with a superwarrant requirement.
The investigative dynamics approach outlined in this Article helps explain what
probably led to all of these positive results. Law enforcement agents view malware
as a tool of last resort because of the relationship between vulnerability and exploit.
The use of malware has been restricted to cases involving serious crimes in which
other investigative avenues are likely not available to the police.
While these conclusions might be used to oppose the misgivings of anybody
prone to assume the worst from the government’s surveillance programs, it also
lends support to legislative efforts to cabin these uses. Because the government
already subjects itself to superwarrant-like processes, there is little to lose and much
to gain through enshrining those processes in law. Because malware could be used
to spy on dissidents or political opponents, Congress should ensure a robust judicial
review, including importing the Wiretap requirements of judicial and intra-agency
review, necessity, serious predicate crime, probable cause, and time limits.
The intrinsic dynamics of malware help keep law enforcement in check in the
use of this powerful tool, at least most of the time. We should recognize both that
we need legislation to protect the privacy of innocent people in cases where the
police might not feel restrained, but also that this legislation can protect privacy
without placing much new burden on the police.
186 See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
187 The leading authority on the argument that search warrants for the installation of mal-
ware on anonymous Internet hosts may lack particularity is an opinion by Magistrate Judge
Stephen Smith, one of the judiciary’s most incisive experts on digital search and seizure. See
In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753,
758–59 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
